Tag Archives: Hezbollah

World Cup

I was in Aleppo during the last World Cup.  It was the end of June 2010, before the “Arab Spring” and before the Syrian uprising.  Flags were everywhere, mostly Brazilian flags.  The Assad regime’s normal sensitivity to the public display of other country’s national symbols was waived for the World Cup, when Aleppines of every creed and none advertised which team they were cheering for by flying flags from their balconies or even hanging them from their upstairs neighbors’ balconies to completely shade their own.  Newsstands were selling flags of all sorts of countries for the fans.  To look around the neighborhoods I visited, it seemed that top-ranked Brazil had the largest number of fans in Syria’s commercial capital.  One warm summer night, I was kept awake by shouting in the streets below and firecrackers; this was the victory celebration for the fans of one team or another.  When the Netherlands eliminated Brazil in the quarter-finals, some Dutch friends of mine joked that they should not go outdoors.

After over three years of civil war, it’s hard to remember the rhythms of normal life in Syria before.  Although the US government tried to isolate the Syrian regime as a Russian ally and a supporter of terrorism, because of its alliance with Hezbollah, many Americans thought of Syria, if at all, as a tourist destination with some amazing Roman ruins and medieval mosques.  The violence has made Syria more notorious now, linked with chemical weapons, dictatorship, and terrorism.  The colorful flags of the 2010 World Cup have been removed, replaced in most of the country by the more sober red, white, and black of the Assad dynasty and the all-black standard of the al-Qa’ida affiliates.  The violence being committed now will leave long shadows on the Syrian population, even after the fighting stops.  But once the fighting stops, however it stops, the Syrians will need to rebuild a civil society.  And to do so, they will need to remember a day when sports loyalties generated good-natured rivalries which could be advertized in green, yellow, and blue from open balconies.

Found: Disunity

Many Americans have a simplistic view of “all Arabs” being the same.  (Or is it “all Muslims”?  The two phrases are usually synonymous, and sometimes includes Sikhs.)  I just read a news article that lays out the political differences between the member states of the Arab League clearly and concisely.  I thought I’d link to it here, mostly for myself, so I can find it again later.

Don’t Look Now

I haven’t been blogging much recently, in large part due to other duties (including securing employment), but also due to not feeling I needed to contribute much to the discussion of the unsurprisingly fruitless “Geneva 2” dialogues, convened with the nearly impossible goal of halting the Syrian Civil War, or the ongoing Turkish political contest between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‘s government and his opponents, allegedly spearheaded by Fethullah Gülen‘s movement.

Now, of course, all eyes are looking to the Crimea to see whether it will play the role that Serbia played in the outbreak of World War I, exactly a century ago this summer.  (Those who scoff at the thought that a large war might break out should know that similar disbelief also preceded the first two world wars.)  But while the world looks away, actors in the Syrian Civil War may try to take advantage of their freedom from scrutiny.  The regime army is forcefully pressing the offensive to capture Yabrud and the Qalamun ridge, both to cut off rebel supply lines from Lebanon and to link the two loyalist strongholds of Damascus and the coast.  Meanwhile, the extreme end of the rebellion, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has issued a proclamation from its headquarters in al-Raqqa on the Euphrates that Christians under their rule must choose between conversion to Islam, paying jizya (a special humiliating tax on non-Muslims), or death.  And the jizya tax is no merely nominal fee; it’s a substantial toll.

But the world’s distraction with the Crimea may prove an opportunity not only for those within Syria, but for outside actors as well, since not all countries are equally distracted.  Syria’s most important international ally, Russia, now has its military committed to a cause much closer to home than the Syrian Civil War, while the Western allies of the non-jihadi opposition (especially the USA and the UK) are also thinking more about the Ukraine than small Mediterranean countries these days, even if they have not (yet) committed to a military response.  On the other hand, both regime and rebel allies within the Middle East (Hezbollah and Iran on the regime side, Qatar and Saudi Arabia on the rebel side) are perhaps less concerned with the developments far to their north than they are with the progress of the conflict close to hand.  So right now the Crimean crisis may be reducing the scale of international involvement in the Syrian Civil War, limiting it to a regional level (although still with plenty of regional money flowing around and far too many casualties).  On the other hand, it would be easier for the USA than for Russia to split its attention between the Crimea and Syria, due to its greater distance from Ukraine and its lesser military commitment, so the Americans may decide to try to make this an opportunity to force through their own desired outcome to the Syrian Civil War while the Russians are in less of a position to object.

(Indeed, some voices in the USA are actively urging increased and swift American action to take advantage of Russia’s diversion.  This piece reminds readers that, as awful as the Crimean crisis is, more people continue to be killed in Syria than the Ukraine.  But the most interesting portion of the analysis for me was the suggestion that the Russian invasion of the Crimea might make China more interested in compromise on Syria.  On the other hand, this piece seeks Russian consistency regarding the Ukraine and Syria and finds it in “putting [Russia’s] own interest ahead of peaceful solutions regardless of what the US and international community wish to see as an outcome.”  It is hardly a surprise, and hardly unique to Russia, to put one’s national interests ahead of the welfare of outsiders; indeed, President Obama has appealed to US national interests to justify military intervention in Syria.)

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad may be aware of his vulnerability to increased American attention while Russia is distracted with the Ukraine, which may be why he recently commended the Russian invasion of the Crimea (perhaps as much to remind the Kremlin that he exists; his statement of support will certainly not change any other country’s mind in favor of Russian intervention) and why the government has started drumming up displays of “popular” support for the president.  (This interpretation would suggest that the Syrian regime is not as self-confident as suggested by this article, although I found the piece very helpfully thought-provoking.)  But Vladimir Putin certain cares far more about the Ukraine than about Syria.  Since I’m a historian and not a prophet, I don’t predict the future, but the international crisis north of the Black Sea may rapidly change the landscape of possibilities east of the Mediterranean, depending on which countries prove most adept at dividing their attentions.

What America Forgets About Syria

As the US Congress appears to be inclining towards authorizing a unilateral and, by most standards, illegal military strike against Syria, here are some points that seem to be forgotten or overlooked in the news I’m reading:

1. One of the US government’s main concerns with the Syrian conflict has been that chemical weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists such as al-Qa’ida.  The presumption that al-Qa’ida does not already have chemical weapons is a crucial piece of the reasoning which blames the Syrian regime for the attack in the Damascus suburbs two weeks ago.  Yet attacking Syria, as President Obama is now proposing, will weaken the Syrian Army’s ability to defend those chemical weapons arsenals.  Since the most effective opposition fighting forces are jihadis affiliated with al-Qa’ida, terrorists are the ones most likely to benefit from any US attack on Syria.  It is worth contrasting John Kerry‘s assertion that “There is a real moderate opposition that exists” and 15-20% of the opposition are extreme with the view of an analyst located in Dubai: “For the U.S. and Western powers, there is a Syrian opposition that they’d like to see and that doesn’t exist.”  In light of al-Qa’ida’s dominance of the Syrian opposition, a US attack on the Syrian regime will increase the feasibility for jihadis to seize chemical weapons.  In other words, a US attack on the Syrian military will increase rather than reduce the threat of chemical weapons deployment against American civilians.

2. A foreign attack on Syria would be a very significant escalation of the conflict.  As I indicated last week, no foreign country has specifically and publicly attacked Syria during this civil war without first being attacked by Syria.  Foreign involvement in the Syrian Civil War, both for and against the regime, has been limited to financial and material supplies and the provision of some foreign fighters acting under the commands of Syrian leaders, with only two exceptions.  Those two exceptions are Turkey, which has returned fire randomly into Syria whenever a Turkish civilian has been hit by bullets coming cross the border, and Israel, which has refused to acknowledge its targeted air strikes of what it alleges were rockets destined for Hezbollah.  For the US or any western country to attack with its own military would escalate the war beyond even a regional conflict into a world conflict.

3. When President Obama was first attempting to build support for attacking Syria, he proposed a “brief” or “surgical” military intervention as “a shot across the bow” in order to send a message to Assad without getting too involved.  Now the Senate Foreign Relations committee is recommending the President be authorized for 60 days, two months, for a war of limited duration.  A shot across the bow demonstrates one’s ability to kill without actually killing anyone, and I suppose the parallel case in Syria would be to bomb the uninhabited desert east of Damascus.  In seeking Congressional support, President Obama has also greatly broadened his notion of US engagement in Syria, which is exactly what the American public fears.

4. The Obama administration released an unclassified document outlining why it believes the Assad regime is behind the chemical weapons attack, intended to convince domestic and international skeptics of the obligation to punish Assad.  Most of the evidence cited in this document supports the assertion that chemical weapons were used, without specifying by whom.  Part of the argument is that the opposition couldn’t have done this, but the report treats the opposition as a unified group, and in particular it does not engage with earlier reports that al-Qa’ida has used chemical weapons in neighboring Iraq (here and here, to cite only Western media).  Much of the evidence in the report is only referred to in vague ways (“We have intelligence,” “streams of human, signals, and geospatial intelligence,” and “Multiple streams of intelligence indicate”) which will not convince a skeptic, but perhaps these bits of evidence cannot be revealed without endangering our informants.  That unfortunately leaves the argument largely still in the “trust us” category, which does little to assuage concerns.

There is one piece of evidence cited in next-to-last paragraph of the US intelligence report which could clinch the case against Assad: “We intercepted communications involving a senior official intimately familiar with the offensive who confirmed that chemical weapons were used by the regime on August 21.”  If it exists and is authentic, this document should be enough to convince skeptics such as Russia that the charges against the regime are not merely “rumors.”  If this is truly an intercepted communication, then presumably it can be released without endangering the interceptor, who is neither the sender nor the recipient.  It should be reasonably straightforward for an Arabic linguistics expert to authenticate the language as educated Syrian Arabic of a sort likely to be used by senior officials.  And yet this document has not been released, and Russia is not convinced.

5. Although the US (and the British Prime Minister) have declared a potential attack legal, the United Nations has disagreed.  Not only the opinion of the UN Special Envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, who is the man tasked with ending the conflict, even the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has said US military intervention would only be legal in self-defense after UN Security Council approval.  The basis of the legality argument requires either that the United States be declared the universal police officer, which understandably no other country has recognized, or that in general any country can attack any other country if it thinks doing will help some people, perhaps at the expense of others, which is a dangerously low bar to international military conflict.  While a possible attack will not open President Obama to prosecution before the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice, this is because the US will presumably use its veto power on the UN Security Council to prevent the case from being referred to an international court.  The irony is that a Nobel Peace Prize recipient is advocating an illegal military action which will be sheltered from prosecution only by his country’s self-interested obstructionism in the United Nations, which is something Western media usually ascribe to Russia and China rather than the US.

6. There has been much talk about American “credibility” in the international community.  But credibility has far less to do with following through on threats and much more to do with holding on to principles even when they are inconvenient.  Since it is clear that the US military used chemical weapons in the Iraq War, the message sent to the international community by a US strike allegedly in response to chemical weapons use is that no one else is allowed to break our monopoly on extreme violence.  Is this the message the US government really wishes to send?  The international community expects US foreign policy to selfishly seek its own narrow interests at the expense of other countries.  As an international friend of mine said to me over dinner, “I would not mind living in America, but I would not want to be a target of American foreign policy.”  The only way to break this perception is to act in accordance with clearly stated principles such as the rule of international law even when it is distasteful and inconvenient, rather than using military means to oust regimes (even heinous and criminal regimes) that we have declared to be our enemies.

The Bottom Line

I believe a US attack on Syria would increase the death and violence of the Syrian Civil War and would escalate the conflict into a world-wide affair.  I do not think that the Syrian regime is fine or that the use of chemical weapons ought to go unpunished.  But I believe that the United States of America is not the body to enforce the chemical weapons ban, apart from authorization by the United Nations.  The fact that Russia and China have been obstructionist in that body does not authorize us to ignore it; instead Syrian blood is on their hands, but we must engage Russia and China diplomatically to break their deadlock.  By attacking Syria the United States will not support the chemical weapons ban, because its attack will be perceived as simply US self-interested foreign policy.

While I have been writing this post, those who stand to benefit from a US strike on Syria have taken the ridge above a Syrian village and shelled the civilian population below.  Does the United States really want to aid these particular rebels?

 

The Difference Between Pragmatism and Loyalty

The most important thing to read on Syria this week is not the news that the regime drove rebels out of the Khalid bin al-Walid Mosque in Homs, but rather this opinion piece by Thorsten Janus and Helle Malmvig in the Christian Science Monitor.  But their proposal depends upon the distinction between pragmatical allegiance and belief-based loyalty.  This crucial distinction affects the Syrian Civil War on both sides, and it deserves to be unpacked more explicitly.

The idea is simple: not everyone who declares allegiance to someone agrees with everything that person espouses.  This is true of political parties.  Cold War-era American propaganda pitted the “godless Communists” in the USSR against the “Christian nation” of the USA, so I was surprised to learn, while visiting the Indian state of Kerala, that the local Communist party has many members drawn from the large South Indian community of St. Thomas Christians.  Indeed, the current president of the Syrian National Council, George Sabra, is a Christian member of one of Syria’s Communist parties.  The conflict between Christianity and Communism is very real in some quarters (as Russian Orthodox priests will tell you) and not in others, and depends widely on what those two terms are understood to mean in various locales.  Not everyone who votes for a Communist party candidate has drunk deeply of doctrinaire Leninism or Maoism (although some have, to be sure).  Some simply see the Communist option as better than any available alternative.

This distinction between pragmatic acceptance and doctrinaire loyalty plays out on both sides of the Syrian Civil War.  On the rebel side, international observers have been alarmed at the increasing influence of jihadi extremism, usually linked to al-Qa’idaFree Syrian Army commanders have complained of soldiers defecting to Jabhat al-Nusra, and cited the lack of ammunition held by the FSA compared to the free-flowing arms of the jihadi Jabhat al-Nusra as an explanation for this trend.  In other words, as Salim Idris has grown increasingly frustrated at the failure of western nations to provide his Free Syrian Army with weaponry, the more extreme groups have plenty of weaponry from international sources supporting their jihad against the infidel Syrian regime.  The idea is that many of those fighting for jihadi groups do not necessarily agree with the ideology, but are willing to tolerate it for the sake of getting what they desire more, which is the weaponry to fight against the regime.  This is precisely the argument made by Mouaz Mustafa, the head of the Syrian Emergency Task Force, according to an interview with him two weeks ago, as to why the US should get more involved with the Syrian Civil War.  On his view, providing weapons with secular strings attached will not only contribute to deposing President Bashar al-Assad, but will also diminish the appeal of jihadi groups, because they will no longer have the advantage of greater resources.

On the other side, religious minorities in Syria have by and large not participated in the rebellion, and in many cases have actively supported the regime.  This is equally true of ‘Alawites, other Shi’ites, and various Christian groups.  This does not mean that they approve of everything which the Syrian Army is doing; it merely means they regard the regime’s side of the Civil War to be more likely to hold a future for them.  They have reason to be alarmed.  Attacks on Coptic Christians in Egypt have increased progressively since the 2011 ouster of president Hosni Mubarak, escalating again after the ouster of Muhammad Mursi because his supporters blame the religious minority for the coup.  When two months ago a Syrian rebel commander filmed himself cutting open a killed ‘Alawite soldier’s corpse, removing an internal organ, and biting into it while spewing threats against all ‘Alawites, he made clear to the ‘Alawites that they have no future in a post-Assad Syria.  That has been the message many Syrian Christians have taken from the abduction and murder of Christian clergy by rebel forces.  Fearing a sectarian cleansing of all non-Sunnis, most religious minorities in Syria see no choice but to support the regime.

The Syrian rebels have done very little to convince religious minorities that a post-Assad Syria will be better for them, or that the occasional vague assurances of minority rights in the future Syria will be enacted.  The one-sided portrayal of the Syrian Civil War by the US government, lionizing the rebels and demonizing the regime, has left many Syrian non-Sunnis feeling that America has betrayed its principles of democratic pluralism and minority rights.  This is where the proposal of Janus and Malmvig could be so important.  If the US and the US-backed rebels could somehow convince non-Sunni minorities that they will be allowed to continue breathing in a post-Assad Syria, then their support for the regime might be less unshakeable.  Janus and Malmvig are banking on the fact that the minorities themselves do not want violence, and probably do not like Assad, so an option which assures their future safety would be very welcome to them.  It is an interesting proposal.

The question is whether that assurance could be given in any credible way.  Would Shi’ites and Arabic Christians trust themselves to an American or UN peacekeeping force?  Or would they suspect the force would fail to prevent them from falling victim to violence by other segments of society?  If the Free Syrian Army declared an amnesty for all ‘Alawites, would any ‘Alawites entrust themselves to the mercies of a force whose commanders have promised to purge all supporters of the regime?  Or would they not rather continue to support the regime, distrusting promises of safety from some rebels while others call for their blood?

With regime forces gaining ground in Homs, many non-Sunni minorities may be feeling that they have chosen the winning side.  But if additional arms flows to Syrian rebel forces again reverse the tide of this long-running civil war, as has happened in the past, then the minorities may feel that their backs are against the wall and they have no choice but to live or die with the regime.  The real importance of the minorities will be seen in their potential as stalemate-breakers.  When two armies are very closely matched, even a small force can shift the course of battle.  This was clearly demonstrated in May when Hezbollah, with fewer than 2,000 soldiers, joined the Syrian Army against the rebels, each of which has over 100,000 soldiers, and yet it is precisely from May that regime forces have begun to gain ground against rebel forces.  If the rebels continue to scare non-Sunni religious minorities with threats of vengeance and extermination, they will simply make it all the harder to defeat the regime.  On the other hand, if the rebels address concerns of non-Sunni rights for example by punishing violence targeting religious minorities in rebel-held territory and providing special protection to religious buildings of other groups, then they might gain ground by undercutting Assad’s support.  The civil war in Syria may be won or lost by the allegiances of non-Sunni religious minorities, whose primary motivation will not be ideology but a pragmatic calculus how to survive the war and its aftermath.

Found: Dissension in Hezbollah’s Ranks

It remains interesting to me which news stories spread between which news media cultures.  Yesterday I found a news story about Hezbollah only picked up in English by Lebanese and Israeli news outlets after being run in Arabic only in London’s Saudi-owned Asharq al-Awsat (“The Middle East”), although today Asharq al-Awsat published the English translation of yesterday’s Arabic article.

It is especially surprising that this article received a limited run because it describes dissension within Hezbollah’s members over involvement in the Syrian Civil War.  Evidently a certain number of rank-and-file Hezbollah members have petitioned the central Hezbollah command to bring their sons home from the war.  It also reports unidentified Hezbollah estimates that they have sent 20 units of 100 men each into Syria, for a total Hezbollah force in Syria of 2000 men minus casualties.  The report indicates that Hezbollah leaders are asking Iran to step up Iranian support for Assad, saying the Lebanese militant group cannot handle the task of supporting the Syrian regime alone.  Although Hezbollah is suspected of having sent fighters to aid Assad earlier, it was only with the siege of al-Qusayr by loyalist forces in late May that Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, publicly announced Hezbollah’s involvement in the fighting in Syria.

The Arabic article has additional details about Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah which are missing from the English translation, but which I am too busy to translate right now, although they may help explain the Israeli interest in the report.  The Arabic also contains a short synopsis of the latest quarrel between Subhi al-Tufayli, former secretary-general of Hezbollah and since 1992 head of a more extreme splinter group off of Hezbollah, and the current leadership.  Al-Tufayli, himself a Shi’ite cleric, apparently pronounced a fatwa saying any members of Hezbollah killed fighting for the Syrian Regime are in hell, a move sure to reduce popular support for Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria.  Hezbollah apparently responded by getting an Iranian Shi’ite’s fatwa against al-Tufayli himself.

Followers of Lebanon’s intricate political dance will not be surprised, however, by the Maronite Michel Aoun‘s defense of Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian Civil War.  Aoun’s “Free Patriotic Movement” party (التيار الوطني الحر) has been allied with Hezbollah since late 2006, and currently leads the “March 8 Alliance” of political parties in parliament, a coalition including Hezbollah.

Syria: That Other Middle Eastern Crisis

When the “Arab Spring” started to hit the Anglophone news with the protests in Tunisia and then Egypt early in 2011, Middle Eastern historians and Islamic Studies experts sat up and took notice.  The resignation of Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak on 11 February 2011 drew in a wider readership, but for most Americans anyway it was the sharp spike in gasoline prices in March 2011 as the US intervened in Libya to impose a no-fly zone and aid the revolt against Mu’ammar Qaddafi that indicated something was happening in the Middle East.  During the ensuing Libyan Civil War, which lasted until October 2011, Libyan headlines dominated the “Middle Eastern spot” in US world news media reporting.

But African nations were not the only venues for Arab Spring protests.  Yemen was already a divided nation with President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih in the capital of Sana’a contending on the one hand with the Shi’ite Houthi rebellion in the north of the country and on the other with a secessionist desire in the south to undo the 1990 unification of Yemen (in which the northern Yemen Arab Republic absorbed the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen).  When major protests began in Sana’a at the end of January, some reporters confidently predicted the swift end of Salih’s presidency.  In fact, Salih held on thirteen months through a rising civil war until he secured a transfer of power to his vice-president at the end of February 2012, with himself remaining in Yemen and immune to prosecution.  Things turned out rather better for Yemen’s Salih than for the former presidents of Tunisia or Egypt.

In the same month, almost the same day, protests in Syria started against the presidency of Bashar al-Assad.  They went mostly unnoticed by Anglophone news media focusing on Egypt and then Libya.  (Perhaps the nineteenth-century European colonial partition of Syria as French and Egypt as English continues in the interests of their respective news constituencies.)  Hafez al-Assad, the predecessor and father of the current Syrian president, had demonstrated his willingness to violently crush any political opposition in his repeated destruction of the central Syrian city of Hama (in 1981 and most violently in 1982, when estimates of 10,000-40,000 people died).  People who knew Syria knew that Bashar al-Assad would not resign easily, but it was after the early March, 2011 arrest of children in Dar’a in the south that protests rapidly grew, and then violence escalated as the army was sent to kill protesters.  Some soldiers and officers defected, refusing to gun down peaceful protesters, and from July 2011 armed rebels have fought back against the remaining state army in the Syrian Civil War.

In Anglophone news media, there have been occasional whispers of continually worsening problems in Syria, but meanwhile US attention focused on Yemen (another former British protectorate), and then on Egyptian elections.  Syria only occasionally made front-page headlines, and only consistently in April-June 2013 as there was public discussion whether chemical weapons had been used and whether that would cross President Barack Obama’s “red line” and trigger US involvement.  Reporting on Syria was often more concerned with US/UK relations with Syria’s allies Russia and Iran, or Israel’s enemy Hezbollah.  However, with the announcements in early June that the EU had withdrawn its arms embargo on Syria and the US would arm the rebels, coupled with the revelation the following week that the CIA had already been training the rebels, it seems that Anglophone public interest in the Syrian Civil War has waned.

For the casual peruser of Google news, it seems the “Middle East spot” in World news is again occupied by Egypt, which is experiencing enormous protests against President Muhammad Mursi, inaugurated one year ago, and the Muslim Brotherhood to which he belongs.  Events in Egypt have certainly been dramatic, with up to millions turning out on the streets of Cairo and other cities, staging rival protests in support of or against the president, resignations of non-Muslim Brotherhood members of Mursi’s cabinet, and a 48-hour ultimatum by the army.  Western news outlets have been caught between not particularly liking Islamists of Mursi’s stripe and not particularly liking military coups deposing democratically elected presidents.

(One cautionary note: several news reports, including this one from the BBC, indicated that the elections which brought Mursi to power were “considered free and fair.”  The passive voice is concealing who considered the elections to be free and fair.  It is true that the elections were not legally challenged, and did not immediately spark widespread street protests, and Mursi won with only a narrow margin rather than a suspicious landslide.  It is also true that there were allegations of Muslim Brotherhood intimidation of voters suspected of opposing Mursi.  I cannot now find the news articles, but at the time there were public threats by preachers against Coptic Christians if Mursi should not be elected, unreasonably blaming the Coptic minority for all opposition to the Islamist candidate, and subsequent low voter turnout in areas with concentrations of Coptic Christians.  The elections were “considered free and fair” by Western governments not wishing to intervene.)

In some ways, Egypt’s news is bigger news than Syria’s.  The news in Syria is: more people are dying.  There continues to be violence.  Just a new number of people killed today.  And Egypt has an estimated population of 84.5 million to Syria’s 22.5 million.  And more Western tourists go to Egypt than to Syria (or at least, they did until the Arab Spring brought the Middle Eastern tourism industry to a standstill).  Egypt is what Anglophone readers want to hear about.

But when even a search of Google News for “Syria” only turns up hits on US Secretary of State John Kerry (not himself a Syrian, as it turns out) and US diplomacy with Russia (neither country part of Syria), it is clear that Syria is not interesting to readers of English-language news.  (This search result has changed during the period of composing this post.)  I fear the result will be that US and UK involvement in Syria will be limited to poorly considered and haphazardly implemented measures designed merely to keep Syria out of the political discourse in the US and the UK, to prevent the “Syrian situation” from becoming a tool against the current governments in those countries.  It need hardly be said that such an evaluation of US and UK “national interests” will only make the Syrian Civil War more complicated and less tractable.  For Western intervention in the Syrian Civil War to do more good than harm, it will take sustained interest in the situation on its own terms, an open willingness to engage with multiple conflicting Syrian perspectives on the conflict, and a refusal to let the siren song of optimistic quick-fixes and band-aids lure policy-makers away from careful analysis, much of it rather bleak.

Related News:

Lost: The Expected Cost of Syrian Regime Operations in Lebanon

Yesterday Reuters reported that Syrian helicopters bombed the Lebanese village of Arsal.  A couple days ago I blogged on Syrian rebel attacks on the Lebanese village of Hermel, but this is a horse of a different color.  Both sides are receiving some support from Lebanese fighters, but until recently most of this support was individual and unorganized.  The open declaration of Hezbollah‘s military support for the Assad regime last month opened the door to more organized Shi’ite participation, which as I commented is likely to increase after rockets were fired by a rebel group (probably the Free Syrian Army) at the predominantly Shi’ite village of Hermel.  Similarly, the Egyptian shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi recently started calling for widespread Sunni fighting against Assad and Hezbollah, although the organization would be provided by rebel groups within Syria.  Still, many Lebanese Muslims, both Sunni and Shi’ite, remember the dark days of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and have tried to avoid getting more involved in Syria’s current civil war.

Since a Syrian helicopter has bombed the mainly Sunni village of Arsal, the calculus for many Lebanese Sunni Muslims has probably changed.  There is no question as to the source of the attack: Syrian rebels do not have helicopters, and the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA, the state news outlet) claimed responsibility for the attack as an attempt to target fleeing “terrorists” (i.e. rebels) taking shelter in the town.  For many Lebanese Sunni Muslims, this will recall the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese Civil War and the ensuing Syrian occupation of Lebanon, which lasted until the 2005 Cedar Revolution.  The 2005 revolution against Syrian military occupation was sparked by the assassination (widely blamed on Syria) of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, himself a Sunni Muslim.  Since the Syrian regime has now demonstrated its willingness to bomb Lebanese Sunni villages, it is likely that more Lebanese Sunnis will regard non-participation in the conflict as simply willingness to be killed whenever the Syrian regime chooses.  The only option to lying down and playing dead, it may now appear, would be to join forces with the Syrian rebels and attempt to accomplish in Syria what was accomplished in Lebanon eight years ago.  Indeed, for Lebanese Muslims under the age of 25, those most likely to want to get involved in the Syrian conflict, no memory of the pain of the Civil War will dampen the enthusiasm begotten by the victorious Cedar Revolution, which in just over two months threw off the rule of this same Syrian regime which is now being opposed by rebel groups.

Unless their elders can restrain the hot-headedness of a younger generation, the attacks on two Lebanese villages this week will likely increase Lebanese participation in the Syrian Civil War.  Sunni voices calling for keeping Lebanon out of Syria’s war might appeal to the fact that Arsal was the scene of an ambush on the Lebanese army a few months ago, and thus distance themselves as loyal Lebanese from the non-cooperative residents of Arsal, but this is unlikely to be appealing.  And given the mosaic of religious groups in Lebanon (seen in this Wikimedia image), increased Sunni and Shi’ite involvement in Syria’s civil war will lead to renewed hostilities within Lebanon between Lebanese.  According to a recent non-governmental statistical study cited by the Wikipedia article on Lebanon (for political stakes, there has been no official census since 1932), Sunnis and Shi’ites are about equally numerous in Lebanon, but they are distributed into different areas that often include small enclaves of other groups.  This will facilitate inter-communal massacres within Lebanon.

The Syrian regime may have estimated that, having the firepower and a good guess where some rebels (or at least rebel sympathizers) were hiding, they could attack the rebel forces more effectively in the Lebanese village of Arsal.  But the cost of this attack will not be measured solely in helicopter fuel and munitions spent.  Increased involvement of Sunni Muslims in Lebanon will offset the advantage the regime recently acquired through the increased involvement of Hezbollah, and may be more likely to prompt international military intervention to prevent the Syrian Civil War from completely engulfing its western neighbor.  Although Syrian maps of Syria’s borders defy international recognition by claiming Lebanon as merely the most beautiful part of Syria, in this instance acting on the viewpoint that Lebanon was an unruly Syrian province is likely to cost more than the Syrian regime expected.

 

Lost: Syrian Rebels’ Strategy

In war, some tactics work and others don’t.  Some tactics are very satisfying to our human desires for power or revenge, but actually hurt the cause for which the tactic is nominally carried out.  Two significant mistakes on the part of the rebels appeared this week, ahead of US government deliberations whether to arm the rebels.

The first is the Syrian rebel shelling of Shi’ite villages in Lebanon in retaliation for Hezbollah involvement in Syria (reported in the bottom half of this NYT article).  While it is all too natural to want to strike back at those who have wounded you or killed the people you care about, I do not see how this tactic will do anything but mobilize greater Hezbollah involvement in Syria on the side of the regime.  In an age before rockets, when fighting was more local and attacks could be repulsed, then a sensible tactic to draw an enemy away from a location was to attack a place they cared about more, so that they would race to protect the second place and abandon the first.  But with indiscriminate rocket fire, if Hezbollah fighters were still in Shi’ite towns in Lebanon, they would not be able to protect anyone there.  No doubt the Syrian rebels are hoping to discourage further Hezbollah attacks on the theory that any attack from Hezbollah will result in further attacks on the Hezbollah fighters’ families.  I suspect the Hezbollah fighters will view these attacks, even apart from the personal desire for revenge stirred up by casualties, as further evidence that they need to support the Assad regime against rebel groups that would shell their villages and kill their families.  This tactic is more likely to confirm Hezbollah involvement than diminish it.

The other rebel misstep comes from Aleppo, where jihadi rebels abducted, tortured, and then publicly executed a fifteen-year-old boy for blasphemy against Muhammad.  (The Telegraph reported that the particular group was the Islamic State of Iraq, while al-Jazeera (Arabic) blamed the execution on Jabhat al-Nusra.  Both groups are affiliated with al-Qa’ida, and according to al-Jazeera the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq declared the two groups unilaterally merged, until overruled a few days ago by al-Qa’ida’s top leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.)  Al-Jazeera (English) reported that the alleged “blasphemy” occurred in a phrase commonly used in colloquial Syrian Arabic, and that the executioners were mostly composed of foreign fighters speaking other dialects.  While one can understand the religious reasoning that goes into this decision, it is also easy to see that criminalizing a local idiom (on pain of death) will quickly breed widespread popular resentment, and executing a fifteen-year-old boy will make parents with younger children wary of the group.  After last week’s re-capture of al-Qusayr by the regime, everyone is expecting a regime battle for Aleppo in the near future, and this summary abduction, torture, and execution will make the populace of Aleppo much less inclined to support the jihadi rebels during that battle.  Indeed, the execution of the teenager might provide the Assad regime with enough additional support to enable it to regain Aleppo itself.  The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights described the act, as paraphrased by al-Jazeera, as “a gift to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” and that is what it is.

Both the loyalists and the rebels in Syria have committed innumerable criminal acts during the war, in an attempt to capitalize on Machiavelli‘s famous dictum in The Prince that rulers can rule through fear or through love, but it is “safer” and easier to rule through fear.  Perhaps the Syrian Civil War is giving the lie to the Renaissance Italian political theorist.

 

Best piece on Syria in a while

The best thing I’ve read on Syria in a long while is this New York Times opinion piece, written by Alia Malek.  It provides an excellent survey of the lead-up to the current revolt and poignant anecdotes revealing how can everyday life differ from what one reads in the headlines.  There is also an amusing discussion about varieties of beards (Hezbollah, Salafi, cosmetic, or now loyalist), amusing in part based on how important the beard identification can be.

More importantly, Malek makes a crucial distinction between what started the Syrian Civil War and what sustains it.  To paraphrase her piece, what started the peaceful demonstrations was complaints about financial corruption ruining the economy and impoverishing the vast majority of Syrians.  She makes that point that most beneficiaries of the corruption were urban Sunnis, while most ‘Alawis (the sect to which Bashar al-Assad himself belongs) were also impoverished, unless they were close to the President himself.  What sustains the revolt now is sectarianism, which has been used both by those who would lead the rebels and by the government to claim legitimacy.  Although Malek does not bluntly spell out the import of the distinction she draws, it holds out the hope that non-sectarian help (help provided across sectarian lines and contingent upon eschewing sectarian rhetoric) could de-sectarianize the movement.  The success of such interventions, of course, would depend heavily on who was receiving the aid, and who else they hoped to receive aid from.

There is nothing I could say to improve this thought-provoking and excellently written piece, so I will just refer you to her words.