Tag Archives: Islamic State of Iraq

The Mosul Expulsion Decree

Although I found many news articles about the ultimatum against the Christians in Mosul issued by ISIS, I was unable to find the text available anywhere, other than in an image which circulated around Twitter.  So here I have transcribed and translated the decree.  Because I have done this quickly, I have no doubt that I have made some errors of transcription or translation; any suggestions welcome!

First, here is the picture of a copy of the decree which I saw on Twitter:

Several copies of the decree were re-tweeted.

The ultimatum decree issued by ISIS ordering Christians to convert, to pay jizya, or to die.

The text (ignore extra ـ characters; for whatever reason the RTL algorithm is failing):

عدد: 40
لتريخ: 19/رمضان/1435هـ
ـ 17/ 7 /2014م
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الدولة الإسلامية
ديوان القضاء
لا اله الا الله
الله
رسول
محمد

بيان

الحمد لله معزّ الإسلام بنصره، ومذلّ الشرك بقهره، وجاعل الأيام دولاً بعدله، والصلاة والسلام على من رفع الله منار الإسلام بسيفه، وبعد : ـ

يقول الله تعالى : وَإِذْ قالت أمة منهم لم تعظون قوما الله مهلكهم  او معذبهم عذابا شديدا قالوا معذرة الى ربكم ولعلهم يتقون : الأعراف (163).ـ

فبعد إبلاغ رؤوس النصارى واتباعهم بموعد الحضور لبيان حالهم في ظل دولة الخلافة في ولاية نينوى أعرضوا وتخلفوا عن الحضور في الموعد المحدد والمبلغ إليهم سلفاً، وكان من المقرر أن نعرض  عليهم إحدى ثلاث :ـ

ـ1 – الإسلام.ـ

ـ2 – عهد الذمة (وهو أخد الجزية منهم).ـ

ـ3 – فإن هم ابوا ذلك فليس لهم الا السيف.ـ

وقد من عليهم امير المؤمنين الخليفة ابرهيم – اعزه الله – بالسماح لهم بالجلاء بانفسهم فقط من حدود دولة الخلافة لموعد أخرة يوم السبت الموافق 21 رمضان 1435 شـاعة الثانية عشر ظهرأء وبعد هذا الموعد ليس بيننا وبينهم إلا السيف.ـ

ـ((ولله العزة ولرسوله وللمؤمنين ولكن المنافقين لايعلمون))ـ

ديوان القضاة
ولاية نينوى

The translation:

There is no God but Allah
Allah
Messenger
Muhammad
In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
The Islamic State
The Council of Judges
Number: 40
Date: 19/ Ramadan / 1435 A.H.
17 / 7 / 2014 A.D.

Declaration

Praise to God who strengthens Islam by his victory, and who humbles polytheism by his subjugation, and makes the days follow one another by his justice, and prayer and peace upon whomever God exalts as the beacon of Islam by his sword, and hence:

God Most High says, “When some of them said: ‘Why do ye preach to a people whom Allah will destroy or visit with a terrible punishment?’- said the preachers: ‘To discharge our duty to your Lord, and perchance they may fear Him.'” (al-A’raf 163)

And after the announcement of the leaders of the Christians and their dependents of the appointed time of the meeting for indicating their condition under the shadow of the state of the caliphate in the province of Nineveh, they rejected and were absent from the meeting at the specified time and the payment to them in advance, and it was determined that we should present to them one of three things:

1. Islam

2. The contract of dhimma (and it includes taking the jizya from them).

3. And if they refuse these, there is nothing for them but the sword.

And the Commander of the Faithful, Caliph Ibrahim (may God strengthen him) has granted to them permission for them to depart with only their persons from the boundaries of the state of the caliphate at the latest by Saturday which falls on 21 Ramadan 1435, at the hour of twelve noon, and after this time there is nothing between us and them but the sword.

But honour belongs to Allah and His Messenger, and to the Believers; but the Hypocrites know not.

Council of Judges

Nineveh Province

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The End of Christianity in Mosul

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has consolidated its hold on the city of Mosul in northern Iraq and is busy converting the metropolitan center to its own extremist brand of Sunni Islam.  Last week the group’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, now styling himself Caliph Ibrahim, issued an order for Christians in the city to (a) convert to Islam, (b) pay the jizya tax on non-Muslims at an unspecified rate, or (c) be killed, although some awareness of the option to leave was displayed in the order as well.  Reports that a church was torched are of uncertain veracity (see a careful analysis of the photos circulating around the web at this blog), but images showing an Arabic ن (for نصارى, nasara, meaning “Christians”) spray-painted on various houses indicate that these houses were available to be seized.  Nor are Christians the only ones to suffer: reportedly some Shiite men have disappeared, Shiite families have been told to flee or be killed, and Shiite homes have been emblazoned with another Arabic letter, ر for رافضي (rafidi) something like “heretic scum,” while reports are also circulating that ISIS has destroyed the Sunni shrine and tomb of Nabi Yunus (the biblical prophet Jonah) in the ruins of ancient Nineveh to the east of the Tigris).  In this climate, most Christians chose to leave Mosul for the comparatively tolerant lands of Iraqi Kurdistan to the north, although refugees have reported being robbed of all their belongings at the checkpoint leaving the city.

The Chaldean Catholic Patriarch of Babylon, Louis Sako, who is presently the highest ranking ecclesiastical official of any denomination in Iraq, commented on the expulsion of the Christians, “For the first time in the history of Iraq, Mosul is now empty of Christians.” Continue reading

Don’t Look Now

I haven’t been blogging much recently, in large part due to other duties (including securing employment), but also due to not feeling I needed to contribute much to the discussion of the unsurprisingly fruitless “Geneva 2” dialogues, convened with the nearly impossible goal of halting the Syrian Civil War, or the ongoing Turkish political contest between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan‘s government and his opponents, allegedly spearheaded by Fethullah Gülen‘s movement.

Now, of course, all eyes are looking to the Crimea to see whether it will play the role that Serbia played in the outbreak of World War I, exactly a century ago this summer.  (Those who scoff at the thought that a large war might break out should know that similar disbelief also preceded the first two world wars.)  But while the world looks away, actors in the Syrian Civil War may try to take advantage of their freedom from scrutiny.  The regime army is forcefully pressing the offensive to capture Yabrud and the Qalamun ridge, both to cut off rebel supply lines from Lebanon and to link the two loyalist strongholds of Damascus and the coast.  Meanwhile, the extreme end of the rebellion, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has issued a proclamation from its headquarters in al-Raqqa on the Euphrates that Christians under their rule must choose between conversion to Islam, paying jizya (a special humiliating tax on non-Muslims), or death.  And the jizya tax is no merely nominal fee; it’s a substantial toll.

But the world’s distraction with the Crimea may prove an opportunity not only for those within Syria, but for outside actors as well, since not all countries are equally distracted.  Syria’s most important international ally, Russia, now has its military committed to a cause much closer to home than the Syrian Civil War, while the Western allies of the non-jihadi opposition (especially the USA and the UK) are also thinking more about the Ukraine than small Mediterranean countries these days, even if they have not (yet) committed to a military response.  On the other hand, both regime and rebel allies within the Middle East (Hezbollah and Iran on the regime side, Qatar and Saudi Arabia on the rebel side) are perhaps less concerned with the developments far to their north than they are with the progress of the conflict close to hand.  So right now the Crimean crisis may be reducing the scale of international involvement in the Syrian Civil War, limiting it to a regional level (although still with plenty of regional money flowing around and far too many casualties).  On the other hand, it would be easier for the USA than for Russia to split its attention between the Crimea and Syria, due to its greater distance from Ukraine and its lesser military commitment, so the Americans may decide to try to make this an opportunity to force through their own desired outcome to the Syrian Civil War while the Russians are in less of a position to object.

(Indeed, some voices in the USA are actively urging increased and swift American action to take advantage of Russia’s diversion.  This piece reminds readers that, as awful as the Crimean crisis is, more people continue to be killed in Syria than the Ukraine.  But the most interesting portion of the analysis for me was the suggestion that the Russian invasion of the Crimea might make China more interested in compromise on Syria.  On the other hand, this piece seeks Russian consistency regarding the Ukraine and Syria and finds it in “putting [Russia’s] own interest ahead of peaceful solutions regardless of what the US and international community wish to see as an outcome.”  It is hardly a surprise, and hardly unique to Russia, to put one’s national interests ahead of the welfare of outsiders; indeed, President Obama has appealed to US national interests to justify military intervention in Syria.)

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad may be aware of his vulnerability to increased American attention while Russia is distracted with the Ukraine, which may be why he recently commended the Russian invasion of the Crimea (perhaps as much to remind the Kremlin that he exists; his statement of support will certainly not change any other country’s mind in favor of Russian intervention) and why the government has started drumming up displays of “popular” support for the president.  (This interpretation would suggest that the Syrian regime is not as self-confident as suggested by this article, although I found the piece very helpfully thought-provoking.)  But Vladimir Putin certain cares far more about the Ukraine than about Syria.  Since I’m a historian and not a prophet, I don’t predict the future, but the international crisis north of the Black Sea may rapidly change the landscape of possibilities east of the Mediterranean, depending on which countries prove most adept at dividing their attentions.

Iran’s Election and Syria

Iran has been one of the Syrian regime’s staunchest allies, even loaning Bashar al-Assad some of its elite Revolutionary Guards to protect him.  But Iran just held a presidential election in which the victor was Hasan Ruhani, a moderate cleric who resigned his previous post shortly after current president Mahmud Ahmadinejad was elected, due to clashes with the then-new president.  How will last Friday’s election of Hasan Ruhani affect the intractable situation in neighboring Syria?

In the short term, not much.  First, because he will not be inaugurated for two more months.  Second, because as a moderate (not really a reformist) he will want to antagonize the conservative clerical establishment as little as possible, especially early in his tenure, until he can build political alliances to support his position.  Third, because the increasingly sectarian nature of Syria’s civil war pushes Shi’ites to support the Assad regime, as seen in Islamic State of Iraq‘s killing of 60 Shi’ites in Hatla last Tuesday and their demolition of the Shi’ite husayniyya there on Friday.  Ruhani is a Shi’ite cleric and Iran will remain the major Shi’ite power in the Middle East.  Given that a large portion of the Syrian rebel forces is run by Sunni jihadis, Iran will continue to support Assad against them.

In the long term, the election of a moderate Iranian president might make something of a difference, although in precisely what form is unclear.  Ruhani has promised increasing “integration” with the rest of the world in order to reverse the isolation Iran has experienced under Mahmud Ahmadinejad.  While most US observers hear this and think of the stalled nuclear talks (Ruhani was Iran’s nuclear negotiator until his resignation in 2005), increasing dialogue with the rest of the world may also serve to broaden international cooperation around Syria.  What benefit may arise from that increased dialogue is unclear at this time, although reduced likelihood of an Iranian strike at Israel in the event of a US-supported military defeat of Assad is among them.   Of course, any benefits derived from increased Iranian willingness to dialogue with other countries will only be realized slowly, if the Syrian conflict extends for more years.  Given the current state of violence, and the threat of a post-Assad second war between jihadis and secularist Sunnis, such a scenario seems plausible.

Lost: Syrian Rebels’ Strategy

In war, some tactics work and others don’t.  Some tactics are very satisfying to our human desires for power or revenge, but actually hurt the cause for which the tactic is nominally carried out.  Two significant mistakes on the part of the rebels appeared this week, ahead of US government deliberations whether to arm the rebels.

The first is the Syrian rebel shelling of Shi’ite villages in Lebanon in retaliation for Hezbollah involvement in Syria (reported in the bottom half of this NYT article).  While it is all too natural to want to strike back at those who have wounded you or killed the people you care about, I do not see how this tactic will do anything but mobilize greater Hezbollah involvement in Syria on the side of the regime.  In an age before rockets, when fighting was more local and attacks could be repulsed, then a sensible tactic to draw an enemy away from a location was to attack a place they cared about more, so that they would race to protect the second place and abandon the first.  But with indiscriminate rocket fire, if Hezbollah fighters were still in Shi’ite towns in Lebanon, they would not be able to protect anyone there.  No doubt the Syrian rebels are hoping to discourage further Hezbollah attacks on the theory that any attack from Hezbollah will result in further attacks on the Hezbollah fighters’ families.  I suspect the Hezbollah fighters will view these attacks, even apart from the personal desire for revenge stirred up by casualties, as further evidence that they need to support the Assad regime against rebel groups that would shell their villages and kill their families.  This tactic is more likely to confirm Hezbollah involvement than diminish it.

The other rebel misstep comes from Aleppo, where jihadi rebels abducted, tortured, and then publicly executed a fifteen-year-old boy for blasphemy against Muhammad.  (The Telegraph reported that the particular group was the Islamic State of Iraq, while al-Jazeera (Arabic) blamed the execution on Jabhat al-Nusra.  Both groups are affiliated with al-Qa’ida, and according to al-Jazeera the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq declared the two groups unilaterally merged, until overruled a few days ago by al-Qa’ida’s top leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.)  Al-Jazeera (English) reported that the alleged “blasphemy” occurred in a phrase commonly used in colloquial Syrian Arabic, and that the executioners were mostly composed of foreign fighters speaking other dialects.  While one can understand the religious reasoning that goes into this decision, it is also easy to see that criminalizing a local idiom (on pain of death) will quickly breed widespread popular resentment, and executing a fifteen-year-old boy will make parents with younger children wary of the group.  After last week’s re-capture of al-Qusayr by the regime, everyone is expecting a regime battle for Aleppo in the near future, and this summary abduction, torture, and execution will make the populace of Aleppo much less inclined to support the jihadi rebels during that battle.  Indeed, the execution of the teenager might provide the Assad regime with enough additional support to enable it to regain Aleppo itself.  The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights described the act, as paraphrased by al-Jazeera, as “a gift to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” and that is what it is.

Both the loyalists and the rebels in Syria have committed innumerable criminal acts during the war, in an attempt to capitalize on Machiavelli‘s famous dictum in The Prince that rulers can rule through fear or through love, but it is “safer” and easier to rule through fear.  Perhaps the Syrian Civil War is giving the lie to the Renaissance Italian political theorist.